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ABSTRACT  
In China, as a socialist market economy, the state performs an 
important role in the economy not only as a regulator but also 
as an active market player through the creation and 
maintenance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In the past, 
means of production were in the hands of the state. But since 
the introduction of market reforms and the opening up of the 
economy to private capital and foreign investment, non-state 
participation in the economy continue to grow and SOEs were 
made to compete with one another, as well as with private 
businesses. In the course of these reforms, some SOEs were 
sold, went bankrupt, or were consolidated to enhance 
efficiency and competitiveness contributing to the 
development of the “survival of the fittest” mechanism among  
 
 
1  This paper was submitted by the author in partial fulfillment of the course 
Companies Law for his Master of Laws Program at Peking University in December 
2014.  
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SOEs (Li, 2003). This is a check against complacency and poor 
performance and, at the same time, provides incentive to 
innovative, competitive and performing SOEs. Consolidation 
of SOEs through mergers and acquisitions (M&As) is seen as 
one avenue by which the state economy is being reformed. 
Hence, the state, through such government authorities as the 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council (SASAC), ensures 
supervision and management of SOE activities, including in 
their M&A activities at home and abroad. 
 
SOE defined  
ccording to Companies Law (Art 65), SOE is “a wholly 
Stated-owned company with limited liability which is solely 
invested in by the State and for which the State Council or the local 
people’s government authorizes the State-owned assets regulatory 
institution under the people’s government at the corresponding 
level to perform the duties of an investor” (Companies Law of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2005) (emphasis supplied). In 
addition, the SOE Law (Art 2) further defines SOE as “an industrial 
enterprise owned by the whole people . . . shall be a socialist 
commodity production and operation unit which shall, in 
accordance with law, make its own managerial decisions, take full 
responsibility for its profits and losses and practice independent  
 
A 
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accounting” (Law on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole 
People, 1988). (emphasis supplied). This Law passed post adoption 
of market reforms helped shaped the transformation of SOEs 
allowing them more space to decide independently provided they 
observe certain set guidelines and regulations.  
SOEs exhibit qualities that set them apart from non-SOEs. For 
instance, in the case of a Chinese SOE, it serves as an “important 
enforcer of social and economic transition” (Guo, Clougherty, & 
Duso, 2013).  Hence, unlike other enterprises fixated with 
maximizing profit, Chinese SOEs are also carriers of “a 
government’s mission and a reflection of social and welfare 
obligations.” At present, there are 117 central SOEs (Central SOEs, 
n.d.) and despite increasing corporatization and diversification of 
investment sources, many listed SOEs are still controlled by the 
state (Lau, Fan, Young,  & Wu, 2007).  
SOE Reform  
SOE reform is the core linkage of China's market-oriented 
economic reform that began in the late 1970s (Li, 2003). Over the 
years, the management and operations of SOEs have undergone 
transformation and SOEs' competitiveness is increasing. Because 
SOE reform is closely intertwined with the larger state-led 
economic reforms, an understanding of the economic thrusts and 
directions set by the government will enable one to better 
appreciate the behavior Chinese SOEs. This is because SOEs, 
through their enormous economic omnipresence and clout, 
PITLO | GOVERNMENT SUPERVISION OF M&A DECISIONS                     19 
 
 
 
 
CHINESE STUDIES PROGRAM LECTURE SERIES    © Ateneo de Manila University 
No. 5, 2018: 16–31                                                                         http://journals.ateneo.edu 
 
constitute one of the fundamental instruments by which the state 
executes planned economic reforms. Through SOE activities, such 
as IPO (initial public offering) listing in domestic and overseas 
equity markets, bankruptcy and sale, and M&A, the state is able to 
reform the country's economic layout and structure. By closing 
down loss-making SOEs and merging several SOEs that produce 
similar or related goods, the quality and the efficiency of the 
economy is improved. Small and medium-sized SOEs were 
rationalized through restructuring, coalition, takeover, lease, 
contractor operation, joint stock operation and selling-off, among 
others. While retaining control of industries related to national 
security and the lifeline of the economy, the state is gradually 
backing out from sectors where market mechanism is proving to 
be a good means of production and distribution. Local people's 
governments, as investors in provincial SOEs, are also being 
encouraged to play a more active role in preserving and increasing 
the value of state-owned assets within their jurisdictions. The non-
public sector is also being expanded and they are also participating 
in M&A deals involving SOEs. Measures are also being placed to 
harness foreign capital (Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of 
a Domestic Enterprise by Foreign Investors, 2009)  in support of 
restructuring and reorganizing the economy and this is 
demonstrated through participation in M&A deals with Chinese 
SOEs as targets. More areas are being opened for foreign 
investment, including those that are previously restricted to 
foreign capital, such as telecommunications, gas, heating,  
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electricity, and pipes. Finally, the state encourages central SOEs to 
expand and invest abroad and one way of carrying this out is 
through cross-border M&As.   
Today, several of China's SOEs are now ranked among the 
world’s biggest and most profitable in their respective fields. In 
fact, today, China already has the second largest number of 
Fortune Global 500 companies in the world (Lin & Milhaupt, 
2013). These SOEs are engaged in diverse fields such as energy, 
power and resources sectors, helping ensure a steady supply of fuel 
and raw materials to sustain China's growing demand and 
developmental needs. One of the major activities of these SOEs 
that has been receiving a lot of attention and scrutiny in recent 
times is their M&As, especially when it involves high-profile target 
companies. And as China transitions from being a principal 
destination of foreign investment to becoming a net capital 
exporter, M&A activities of the country’s SOEs will continue to 
generate global attention. In fact, China's M&A transactions, both 
inbound and outbound, has been a major driver in the rebound of 
the global M&A market in 2010 and 2011 alone (Guo & Rizzi, 
2012).  
M&A defined 
M&A transactions, especially when they involve foreign entities 
as targets, enable Chinese companies, notably SOEs, to gain access 
to technology, managerial know-how and experience, establish 
footprint in new markets, and raise additional capital. Mergers 
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may take several forms as provided for in Art 173 of Companies  
Law. It can be carried out through amalgamation, with a company 
amalgamating to another company, the former being dissolved in 
the process. It can also be executed through a merger of two or 
more entities establishing a new entity and resulting in the 
dissolution of the pre-merger entities. Art 174 states that a merger 
agreement shall be signed by companies about to merge and their 
respective balance sheet and detailed asset inventory shall be 
drawn. Creditors shall also be notified within the prescribed period 
and means so they can claim debt repayment (Art 174). The new 
entity to emerge from the merger shall assume the claims and debts 
of all pre-merger companies or the company that was 
amalgamated to it (Art 175). If changes had been made to the 
registration items as a result of the merger, the same shall be 
registered with the proper company registration authority (Art 
180). Likewise, if a new company was incorporated post merger, 
said incorporation shall also be registered accordingly (Art 180). 
SOE Law provides certain provisions concerning mergers. 
According to Art 18 of SOE law, “the merger of enterprises … shall 
be subject to approval by the government or the competent 
department of the government in accordance with the provisions 
of the laws and administrative rules and regulations.” Art 20 
provides for the protection of the property and liquidation of 
claims and debts of enterprises being merged. Art 21 provides for 
approval of changes in the scope of operation of merged 
enterprises and registration of such changes with administrative  
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authorities for industry and commerce. Compared to their private 
counterparts, mergers or combinations between SOEs under 
SASAC supervision are, in practice, generally exempted from anti-
trust scrutiny (Zheng, 2009).   
SASAC supervision of central SOEs 
SASAC “performs investor’s responsibilities, supervises and 
manages the state-owned assets of the enterprises under the 
supervision of the Central Government (excluding financial 
enterprises), and enhances the management of the state-owned 
assets (Main functions and responsibilities of SASAC, n. d.). 
Founded in 2003 to boost reforms of SOEs , SASAC's internal 
bureaus handle different aspects of SOE management and 
supervision including financial supervision and evaluation, 
property right management, enterprise reform, restructuring, and 
remuneration, and capital returns management, among others 
(Internal Bureaux of SASAC, n. d.). Furthermore, it is also 
responsible for “supervising the preservation and increment of the 
value of the state-owned assets of the supervised enterprises” 
(Main Functions of SASAC, n. d.). It is also in charge of appointing 
SOE top executives, determining their pay and benefits, and 
approving sales or transfer of SOE stocks or assets. It must be 
noted that only big central SOEs fall under the mandate of SASAC. 
Other SOEs, such as those of small and medium scale, are usually 
under the control and supervision of local governments.  
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In accordance with law, SASAC decides on such major matters 
as mergers (Decree of the State Council of the People’s Republic of  
China, 2003). It reviews merger proposals and refers the same to 
the appropriate level of government for approval (Decree of the 
State Council, Article 21, 2003). Moreover, when deciding on 
mergers, SASAC-appointed representatives, shareholders or 
directors to SOEs “shall voice their opinions and exercise the right 
to vote according to the instructions of the State-owned assets 
supervision and administration authority,” as well as “report to the 
said authority in due time about their performance of 
responsibilities” (Decree of the State Council, Article 22, 2003). 
Finally, SASAC also coordinates work in relation to mergers and 
“cooperate with the relevant departments to make arrangements 
for settling laid-off workers” (Decree of the State Council, Article 
22, 2003). 
Chinese SOEs directly benefited from government's active 
support for the “Going Global” strategy. Through this initiative, 
SOEs are encouraged to expand and invest abroad and one of the 
primary means by which this is accomplished is through engaging 
in M&As. Qualified central SOEs are encouraged to go public, 
introduce strategic domestic and international investors and enter 
into partnerships with foreign enterprises (Li, 2003; Buckley, 
Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss, & Zheng, 2007). Large SOEs are also 
encouraged to establish factories abroad and to engage in 
transnational M&A transactions.  State assistance for this endeavor 
is channeled through improved overseas investment consulting, 
legal guarantee and international coordination systems (Li, 2003). 
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Moreover, the state also utilizes an array of policy tools to facilitate 
outward foreign direct investment (FDI) made by SOEs, including 
“low-interest financing, favorable exchange rates, reduced taxation, 
industrial guidance, and subsidized insurance for expatriates” 
(Peng, 2012). 
M&As: Chinese SOE style 
Chinese SOEs support state goals and objectives in the conduct 
of their business and their M&A  deals may reflect this. Among the 
goals set by the Chinese government include “obtaining natural 
resources, acquiring advanced technology and management 
expertise, pursuing product diversification, expanding financial 
channels, and promoting brand recognition of Chinese companies 
in developed nations. As a result, Chinese cross-border merger 
activity was most active in the following industries: natural 
resources (e.g., oil, gas, and minerals), services (e.g., banking, 
transportation, and construction), and some industries involving 
specialized technologies such as computer, automobile 
manufacturing, and electricity power generation” (Guo, 
Clougherty & Duso, 2013; p. 7). These strategic assets were seen as 
essential in “(1) bolstering economic and social development at 
home, and (2) compensating for firm-level competitive 
disadvantages” (Luo & Tung, 2007). 
SOEs often weigh two key issues in their M&A decisions: 1) 
from a profit standpoint - whether the target would enhance the 
SOE's value and future profitability and; 2) from a social welfare  
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and national economic development standpoint - whether the  
target would contribute to the attainment of national priorities 
(Guo, Clougherty & Duso, 2013, pp. 9-10). These two objectives 
may sometimes conflict with one another and this is where the 
uniqueness of SOEs comes into being. There will be occasions 
when public interest and social welfare considerations will trump 
profit maximization calculus in making acquisitions. Thus, in 
estimating the value of a target, Chinese SOE do not only look at 
the financials but also consider the potential value that the target 
can bring in attaining other non-economic national objectives set 
by the Chinese state.  
Chinese SOEs demonstrate some unique behavior that sets 
them apart from their non-state peers. For instance, compared to 
their non-state multinational enterprise counterparts, Chinese 
SOEs pay higher acquisition premiums when they engage in cross-
border M&A deals and such SOEs even pay higher acquisition 
premiums - “the difference between the actual cost of acquiring a 
target and an estimate of the targets pre-acquisition value” - when 
they act as parents and employ a privately-owned company to 
complete the deal (Guo, Clougherty & Duso, 2013, p. 3). Thus, 
differences may sometimes arise between the state, which is the 
majority and controlling shareholder in an SOE, and non-state 
shareholders in relation to M&As decisions. This can happen for 
instance when the state decides to acquire a target by offering a bid 
higher than its estimated economic value arguing that said 
acquisition may serve perceived non-economic goals. State backing  
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is a major factor that can explain the aggressiveness of Chinese 
SOEs in undertaking foreign acquisitions. With the state bringing 
in the weight of accumulated foreign reserves, Chinese SOEs face 
less constraint in raising capital to finance foreign target 
acquisitions . In addition, SOEs also enjoy preferential access to 
loans from state-owned banks, interest subsidies, and special funds 
to spur foreign trade, aid and development, among others (Guo, 
Clougherty & Duso, 2013). 
Chinese SOEs, like other SOEs from emerging economies, are 
less efficient in terms of decision-making and corporate 
management (Guo, Clougherty & Duso, 2013). This inefficiency 
can be attributed to the perpetual need to balance economic and 
sociopolitical goals in their actions, including in their M&A 
involvements. One must also understand that Chinese SOEs are 
latecomers in the international market and that they suffer from 
technology handicaps and inadequacy of managerial competency 
compared to other companies especially from developed countries 
(Peng, 2012). This and the scarcity of strategic resources in their 
homeland prompts Chinese SOEs to display more boldness in 
overseas acquisitions, offering prices usually higher than most 
competitors. Information asymmetry also plays a role in SOEs' 
paying higher acquisition premiums (Reuer, Tong, & Wu, 2012). 
Aside from the target not disclosing full information about itself, 
variance in institutional environment (notably when acquirer is an 
SOE and target is a private enterprise) also contributes to difficulty  
in assessing the real value of the target (Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath, 
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& Pisano (2004) and this is amplified in the case of cross-border 
acquisitions.  
Another interesting feature of Chinese SOEs in relation to their 
international activities, including cross-border M&A deals is their 
close cooperation through inter-group networks. While Chinese 
SOEs may compete on the home front, SASAC encourages them to 
collaborate with one another overseas. Linkages between various 
SOEs involved in complementary industries (e.g. such as those 
between steel producers and industries that use steel as the primary 
raw material for their products, such as machine and automobile 
manufacturers and shipbuilders) facilitate innovation, sharing of 
information, marketing and pooling of capital for big projects. 
These collaborations can take the form of equity joint ventures and 
contractual alliances, which to other jurisdictions can be examined 
for possible antitrust violations (Lin & Milhaupt, 2013). 
Conclusion 
As a socialist market economy, the state remain a major actor in 
shaping and transforming China's economy and one of the means 
by which this is performed is through its SOEs. Passing an SOE 
Law and providing a wide range of policy support tools, including 
almost unlimited financial backing and guarantees, among many 
other forms of assistance, highlight the significance being attached 
by the state to SOEs. And these entities, in turn, have been very 
active at home and recently abroad making M&A deals here and 
there to secure strategic assets for China and serve other national  
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goals and objectives as defined by the state leadership. However, 
while the Chinese government issued several guidelines to govern 
foreign participation in M&A transactions within China, no such 
clear rules were given to Chinese SOEs as they engage in cross-
border M&As. Whether this constitutes an evolving distance being 
set by the state to give SOEs an autonomous space to make their 
own decisions or simply the lack of capacity or willingness of the 
state to oversee the flurry of activities of these SOEs remain a 
subject of discussion.  
It may be difficult to ascertain the internal capacity of these 
SOEs because of their seemingly intertwined relationship with one 
another and with the state. But a mechanism to assess the conduct 
of these SOEs, especially in relation to such actions as M&As, 
should be made to prevent mismanagement and flawed decisions 
that can be easily covered up in the competing interests that 
motivate SOE behavior abroad. There is also a need to come up 
with the proper balance between profit and social welfare to ensure 
the viability and profitability of SOEs in the long run. The wide 
range of support extended to SOEs, while well-intentioned, may 
stunt the development of efficiency and rationality in SOEs' 
decision making. Some SOE top officials may make ill-advised 
decisions thinking that the state will always bail an SOE anyway 
when it ran into financial woes on account of its ill-studied actions. 
Finally, being relatively new to the global market, SOEs must 
come to terms with different legal jurisdictions and regulatory  
environments, knowledge and mastery of which can help ensure 
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success. Likewise, familiarizing with the intricacies of the 
international market environment and developing competencies in 
such areas as defining best or suitable targets, properly valuating 
the same and identifying the best method of entering a new 
market, among others, are important considerations for these 
SOEs to increase their chance for success.  And in all these, the 
Chinese government can continue to provide appropriate guidance 
and a big helping hand.  
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